Abstract-We consider secure and reliable connectivity in wireless sensor networks that utilize the heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme. We model the unreliability of wireless links by an on/off channel model that induces an Erdős-Rényi graph, while the heterogeneous scheme induces an inhomogeneous random key graph. The overall network can thus be modeled by the intersection of both graphs. We present conditions (in the form of zero-one laws) on how to scale the parameters of the intersection model, so that with high probability: i) all of its nodes are connected to at least k other nodes, i.e., the minimum node degree of the graph is no less than k, and ii) the graph is k-connected, i.e., the graph remains connected even if any k − 1 nodes leave the network. These results are shown to complement and generalize several previous results in the literature. We also present numerical results to support our findings in the finitenode regime. Finally, we demonstrate via simulations that our results are also useful when the on/off channel model is replaced with the more realistic disk communication model. Index Terms-Wireless sensor networks, security, heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme, disk model, on/off channel model, random graphs.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Wireless Sensor Networks and Security
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) enable a broad range of applications in diverse areas such as military, health, and environmental monitoring, among others [3] . A typical WSN consists of hundreds, thousands, or hundreds of thousands of nodes that are often deployed randomly, perhaps with no knowledge of post-deployment configuration. In many applications, WSNs are envisioned to be deployed in hostile environments, where eavesdropping, node capture, and denialof-service attacks are possible, inducing the need for cryptographic protection. Indeed, securing WSNs is a key challenge given their unique features [4] ; e.g., limited computational capabilities, limited transmission power, and vulnerability to node capture attacks. In particular, classical asymmetric cryptosystems are generally slow and require excessive energy Manuscript received February 21, 2018 ; revised October 18, 2018; accepted December 31, 2018 . Date of publication January 10, 2019; date of current version May 20, 2019 . This work was supported in part by the National Science Foundation under Grant CCF-1617934 and in part by Philip and M. Dowd. R. Eletreby was supported in part by the Dowd Fellowship from the College of Engineering, Carnegie Mellon University. This paper was presented at the 2016 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory [1] and the 2017 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory [2] .
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Communicated by R. La and memory consumption. On the other hand, symmetric cryptosystems offer a faster and energy-efficient alternative, making them a feasible choice for securing WSNs [5] , [6] . Clearly, symmetric cryptosystems require a mechanism for key-establishment that obeys the aforementioned limitations of WSNs and facilitates the possible change of topology over time. Key predistribution, namely, installing cryptographic keys to sensor nodes' memory, was shown to be a practical option for key-establishment in large-scale WSNs [5] . In particular, random key predistribution schemes are currently regarded as the most feasible solutions for securing WSNs; e.g., see [7, Ch. 3] and [8] , and references therein. Random key predistribution schemes were first introduced in the pioneering work of Eschenauer and Gligor [5] . Their scheme, hereafter referred to as the EG scheme, operates as follows: prior to deployment, each sensor node is assigned a random set of K cryptographic keys, selected uniformly from a key pool of size P (without replacement). After deployment, two nodes can communicate securely over an existing channel if they share at least one key. The EG scheme led the way to several other variants, including the q-composite scheme [6] , and the random pairwise scheme [6] among others. We remark that random key predistribution schemes do not assume any knowledge of the post-deployment topology, which is likely the case for many real-world implementations of WSNs that are deployed randomly.
The aforementioned random key predistribution schemes (including the original EG scheme [5] ) have been designed for homogeneous networks. In particular, they assume that the sensor devices comprising the network are identical with each other, and thus assign the same number of keys to each sensor. However, many commercial and military applications are envisioned to consist of heterogeneous nodes [9] - [12] . Namely, it is expected that participating sensors will have varying level of resources (for communication, computation, storage, power, etc.) and possibly a varying level of security and connectivity requirements. A pronounced example of such heterogeneous networks is the Internet-of-Battlefield Things (IoBT) [13] . IoBT comprises heterogeneous devices with different hardware capabilities and mission requirements. Hence, it may be reasonable to assign more keys to missioncritical nodes to enhance their connectivity and increase their robustness. Clustered networks [14] represent another example of heterogeneous networks where cluster heads are typically empowered with more advanced radio interface and perhaps more capable energy sources. Since cluster heads play a key role in connecting several parts of the network, their connectivity and robustness are essential to the proper operation of the network. Hence, cluster heads are expected to receive more keys compared to typical sensor nodes in order to enhance their secure connectivity with the rest of the network. As a result, it may no longer be sensible to assign the same number of keys to all sensors in such heterogeneous networks.
where two nodes are adjacent only if they share a key and are within the transmission radius of each other. Unfortunately, analyzing the k-connectivity of K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) ∩ I(n; ρ) [26] is likely to be very challenging. For example, despite many attempts, the Gupta and Kumar [25] conjecture on the 1-connectivity of G(n; α) ∩ I(n; ρ) where G(n; α) represents an Erdős-Rényi (ER) graph, has remained unsolved until very recently by Penrose [27] ; see [26] for a detailed discussion on the difficulties involved in analyzing the intersection of different types of graphs. We remark that K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) is much more complicated than an ER graph (see [15] ), and our goal is to analyze k-connectivity for arbitrary k = 1, 2, . . ..
The preceding discussion brings about a crucial question, namely, is there any communication model that provides a good approximation of the classical disk model, but also allows a comprehensive analysis of the resulting WSN?
This question was answered in the affirmative in [26] and [28] , where it was shown that an independent on-off channel model -represented by an ER graph G(n; α) -provides a good approximation of the disk model in settings similar to those considered here. Inspired by the success in these previous approaches, here we also model the wireless communication connectivity of the WSN by an ER graph G(n; α) and study the k-connectivity properties of the intersection model K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) ∩ G(n; α). As soon will become apparent, this approach will enable us to i) establish rigorous results concerning the secure k-connectivity of a WSN albeit using a simplified wireless communication model; ii) demonstrate via simulations that these results still appear to apply under the more realistic disk model. In particular, simulation results indicate that K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) ∩ I(n; ρ) and K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) ∩ G(n; α) behave similarly with respect to k-connectivity, when α and ρ are matched to lead to the same probability of wireless channel availability.
D. Contributions
As mentioned above, we study the secure k-connectivity of a WSN that employs the heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme. The wireless communication connectivity is modeled by an on/off communication model consisting of independent wireless channels each of which is either on (with probability α), or off (with probability 1 − α); this leads to a standard ER graph [29] , denoted by G(n; α). Hence, the overall random graph modeling the WSN becomes the intersection of an inhomogeneous random key graph with an ER graph, denoted K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) ∩ G(n; α).
We establish two main results for K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) ∩ G(n; α); namely, i) a zero-one law for the minimum node degree of K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) ∩ G(n; α) to be no less than k for any nonnegative integer k and ii) a zero-one law for the k-connectivity property of K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) ∩ G(n; α) for any non-negative integer k. More precisely, we present conditions on how to scale the parameters of K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) ∩ G(n; α) so that i) its minimum node degree is no less than k and ii) it is kconnected, both with high probability when the number of nodes n gets large.
Our results are supported by a simulation study (see Section IV) demonstrating that i) despite their asymptotic nature, our results can in fact be useful in designing finite-node WSNs so that they achieve secure k-connectivity with high probability; and ii) despite the simplicity of the on-off communication model, the probability of k-connectivity in the resulting WSN approximates very well the case where the disk model is used. In addition, our results are shown to complement and generalize those of several previous works in the literature (see Section III for details).
E. Notation and Conventions
All limiting statements, including asymptotic equivalence are considered with the number of sensor nodes n going to infinity. The random variables (rvs) under consideration are all defined on the same probability triple (, F , P). Probabilistic statements are made with respect to this probability measure P, and we denote the corresponding expectation by E. The indicator function of an event E is denoted by 1 1 1 [E] . We say that an event holds with high probability (whp) if it holds with probability 1 as n → ∞. For any event E, we let E denote the complement of E. For any discrete set S, we write |S| for its cardinality. For sets S a and S b , the relative complement of S a in S b is given by S a \ S b . In comparing the asymptotic behaviors of the sequences {a n }, {b n }, we use a n = o(b n ), a n = ω(b n ), a n = O(b n ), a n = (b n ), and a n = (b n ), with their meaning in the standard Landau notation. Namely, we write a n = o(b n ) (respectively, a n = ω(b n )) as a shorthand for the relation lim n→∞ a n b n = 0 (respectively, lim n→∞ a n b n = ∞), whereas a n = O(b n ) means that there exists c > 0 such that a n ≤ cb n for all n sufficiently large. Also, we have a n = (b n ) if b n = O(a n ), or equivalently, if there exists c > 0 such that a n ≥ cb n for all n sufficiently large. We write a n = (b n ) if we have a n = O(b n ) and a n = (b n ) at the same time. We also use a n ∼ b n to denote the asymptotic equivalence lim n→∞ a n /b n = 1. We write N 0 to denote the set of natural numbers excluding zero, i.e., N 0 = {1, 2, 3, . . .}. Finally, we write X d = Y , for two random variables X and Y , to mean that X and Y are equal in distribution.
II. THE MODEL
We consider a network consisting of n sensor nodes labeled as v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n . Each sensor is assigned to one of the r possible classes (e.g., priority levels) according to a probability distribution μ μ μ = {μ 1 , μ 2 , . . . , μ r } with μ i > 0 for each i = 1, . . . , r ; clearly it is also needed that r i=1 μ i = 1. Prior to deployment, each class-i node is given K i cryptographic keys selected uniformly at random from a pool of size P. Hence, the key ring x of node v x is a P K tx -valued random variable (rv) where P A denotes the collection of all subsets of {1, . . . , P} with exactly A elements and t x denotes the class of node v x . The rvs 1 , 2 , . . . , n are then i.i.d. with
After the deployment, two sensors can communicate securely over an existing communication channel if they have at least one key in common.
Throughout, we let
. . , K r }, and assume without loss of generality that
Consider a random graph K induced on the vertex set V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } such that distinct nodes v x and v y are adjacent in K, denoted by the event K xy , if they have at least one cryptographic key in common, i.e.,
The adjacency condition (1) characterizes the inhomogeneous random key graph K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) that has been introduced recently in [15] . This model is also known in the literature as the general random intersection graph; e.g., see [30] - [32] . The inhomogeneous random key graph models the cryptographic connectivity of the underlying WSN. In particular, the probability p i j that a class-i node and a class-j node have a common key, and thus are adjacent in K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P), is given by
as long as
clearly have p i j = 1. We also find it useful to define the mean probability λ i of edge occurrence for a class-i node in K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P). With arbitrary nodes v x and v y , we have
as we condition on the class t y of node v y . In this work, we consider the communication topology of the WSN as consisting of independent channels that are either on (with probability α) or off (with probability 1 − α). More precisely, let {B i j (α) : 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n} denote i.i.d Bernoulli rvs, each with success probability α. The communication channel between two distinct nodes v x and v y is on (respectively, off) if B xy (α) = 1 (respectively if B xy (α) = 0). The on/off channel model 1 induces a standard Erdős-Rényi (ER) graph G(n; α) [34] , defined on the vertices V = {v 1 , . . . , v n } such that v x and v y are adjacent, denoted C xy , if B xy (α) = 1.
We model the overall topology of a WSN by the intersection of an inhomogeneous random key graph K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) and an ER graph G(n; α). Namely, nodes v x and v y are adjacent in K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) ∩ G(n; α), denoted E xy , if and only if they are adjacent in both K and G. In other words, the edges in the intersection graph K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) ∩ G(n; α) represent pairs of sensors that can securely communicate as they have i) a communication link in between that is on, and ii) a shared cryptographic key. Therefore, studying the connectivity properties of K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) ∩ G(n; α) amounts to studying the secure connectivity of heterogeneous WSNs under the on/off channel model.
Hereafter, we denote the intersection graph K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P)∩ G(n; α) by the graph H(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P, α). To simplify the notation, we let θ θ θ = (K K K , P), and = (θ θ θ, α). The probability of 1 An interesting direction for future work is to consider a heterogeneous link-failure model, where the link between a type-i and type-j node fails with probability 1 − α i j , for each i, j = 1, . . . , r. Some preliminary results in that case can be found in [33] .
edge existence between a class-i node v x and a class-j node v y in H(n; μ μ μ, ) is given by
by independence. Similar to (3), the mean edge probability for a class-i node in H(n; μ μ μ, ), denoted i , is given by
Throughout, we assume that the number of classes r is fixed and does not scale with n, and so are the probabilities μ 1 , . . . , μ r . All of the remaining parameters are assumed to be scaled with n.
We close this section with some additional notation that will be useful in the rest of the paper. For any three distinct nodes v x , v y and v j , we define E x j∩yj := E x j ∩ E yj , E x j∩yj := E x j ∩ E yj , E x j∩yj := E x j ∩ E yj , and E x j∩yj := E x j ∩ E yj . Consider the vertex set V = {v 1 , . . . , v n }. For each node v i ∈ V, we define N i as the set of neighbors of node v i . Also, for any pair of vertices v x , v y , we let N xy be the set of nodes in V \ {v x , v y } that are neighbors of both v x and v y ; i.e., N xy = N x ∩ N y . We also let N x y denote the set of nodes in V \ {v x , v y } that are neighbors of v x , but are not neighbors of v y . Similarly, N x y is defined as the set of nodes in V \{v x , v y } that are not neighbors of v x , but are neighbors of v y . Finally, N xy is the set of nodes in V \ {v x , v y } that are not neighbors of either v x or v y . We also define S xy = x ∩ y .
III. MAIN RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
A. Results
We refer to a mapping K 1 , . . . , K r , P : N 0 → N r+1 0 as a scaling (for the inhomogeneous random key graph) as long as the conditions
are satisfied for all n = 2, 3, . . .. Similarly any mapping α : N 0 → (0, 1) defines a scaling for the ER graphs. As a result, a mapping : N 0 → N r+1 0 × (0, 1) defines a scaling for the intersection graph H(n; μ μ μ, n ) given that condition (5) holds. We remark that under (5), the edge probabilities p i j will be given by (2) .
We first present a zero-one law for the minimum node degree being no less than k in the inhomogeneous random key graph intersecting ER graph.
Theorem 1: Consider a probability distribution μ μ μ = {μ 1 , . . . , μ r } with μ i > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and a scaling :
Next, we present a zero-one law for the k-connectivity of H(n; μ μ μ, ).
Theorem 2: Consider a probability distribution μ μ μ = {μ 1 , . . . , μ r } with μ i > 0 for i = 1, . . . , r and a scaling :
we have
In words, Theorem 1 (respectively Theorem 2) states that the minimum node degree in H(n; μ μ μ, n ) is greater than or equal to k (respectively H(n; μ μ μ, n ) is k-connected) whp if the mean degree of class-1 nodes, i.e., n 1 (n), is scaled as (log n + (k − 1) log log n + γ n ) for some sequence γ n satisfying lim n→∞ γ n = ∞. On the other hand, if the sequence γ n satisfies lim n→∞ γ n = −∞, then whp H(n; μ μ μ, n ) has at least one node with degree strictly less than k, and hence is not k-connected. This shows that the critical scaling for the minimum node degree of H(n; μ μ μ, n ) being greater than or equal to k (respectively for H(n; μ μ μ, n ) to be k-connected) is given by 1 (n) = log n+(k−1) log log n n , with the sequence γ n : N 0 → R measuring the deviation of 1 (n) from the critical scaling.
The scaling condition (6) can be given a more explicit form under some additional constraints. In particular, it was shown in [15, Lemma 4.2] 
where K avg,n = r j =1 μ j K j,n denotes the mean key ring size in the network. This shows that the minimum key ring size K 1,n is of paramount importance in controlling the connectivity and reliability of the WSN; as explained previously, it then also controls the number of mobile sensors that can be accommodated in the network. For example, with the mean number K avg,n of keys per sensor is fixed, we see that reducing K 1,n by half means that the smallest α n (that gives the largest link failure probability 1 − α n ) for which the network remains k-connected whp is increased by two-fold for any given k; e.g., see Figure 3 for a numerical example demonstrating this.
B. Comments on the Additional Technical Conditions
We first comment on the additional technical condition λ 1 (n) = o (1) . This is enforced here mainly for technical reasons for the proof of the zero-law of Theorem 1 (and thus of Theorem 2) to work. A similar condition was also required [22, Th. 1] for establishing the zero-law for the minimum node degree being no less than k in the homogeneous random key graph intersecting ER graph. In view of (11), this condition is equivalent to
In real-world WSN applications the key pool size P n is envisioned to be orders of magnitude larger than any key ring size in the network [5] , [35] . As discussed below in more details, this is needed to ensure the resilience of the network against adversarial attacks. In conclusion, (12) (and thus λ 1 (n) = o(1)) is indeed likely to hold in most applications. Conditions (7) and (8) are also likely to be needed in practical WSN implementations in order to ensure the resilience of the network against node capture attacks; e.g., see [5] and [35] . To see this, assume that an adversary captures a number of sensors, compromising all the keys that belong to the captured nodes. If P n = O(K r,n ) contrary to (8), then it would be possible for the adversary to compromise a positive fraction of the key pool (i.e., (P n ) keys) by capturing only a constant number of sensors that are of type r . Similarly, if P n = o(n), contrary to (7), then again it would be possible for the adversary to compromise (P n ) keys by capturing only o(n) sensors (whose type does not matter in this case). In both cases, the WSN would fail to exhibit the unassailability property [36] , [37] and would be deemed as vulnerable against adversarial attacks. We remark that both (7) and (8) were required in [15] and [22] for obtaining the one-law for connectivity and k-connectivity, respectively, in similar settings to ours.
Finally, the condition (9) is enforced mainly for technical reasons and takes away from the flexibility of assigning very small key rings to a certain fraction of sensors when kconnectivity is considered; we remark that (9) is not needed for the minimum node degree result given at Theorem 1. An equivalent condition was also needed in [15] for establishing the one-law for connectivity in inhomogeneous random key graphs. We refer the reader to [15, Sec. 3.2] for an extended discussion on the feasibility of (9) for real-world WSN implementations, as well as possible ways to replace it with milder conditions.
We close by providing a concrete example that demonstrates how all the conditions required by Theorem 2 can be met in a real-world implementation. Consider any number r of sensor types, and pick any probability distribution μ μ μ = {μ 1 , . . . , μ r } with μ i > 0 for all i = 1, . . . , r . For any channel probability α n = ( log n n ), set P n = n log n and use 
, the resulting network will be k-connected whp for any k = 1, 2, . . .. Of course, there are many other parameter scalings that one can choose.
C. Comparison With Related Work
The classical Eschenauer-Gligor scheme induces a class of random graphs denoted by the homogeneous random key graphs, K(n; K , P), where all nodes belong to the same class and receive the same number K of keys. Several properties of the homogeneous random key graph, K(n; K , P), have been extensively studied in literature. In particular, the 1-connectivity of K(n; K , P) has been investigated in [24] , [35] , [38] , and [39] under full visibility, i.e., when all pairs of nodes have a communication channel in between. Therein, authors provided scaling conditions on the key ring size K n and the key pool size P n as functions of the network size n such that the resulting network is connected with high probability as the number of nodes gets large. Moreover, the k-connectivity property of K(n; K , P) was investigated under full visibilty in [40] .
Our paper extends these results to the heterogeneous setting, where sensor nodes have different levels of resources and security/connectivity requirements, thus possibly belonging to different classes. Such heterogeneity induces the need for the inhomogeneous random key graph K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) as an accurate model for the crypto-connectivity of the resulting WSN. Also, unlike the aforementioned results that assume full visibility, our paper considers the wireless connectivity of the network through the on/off channel model.
In [22] , Zhao et al. investigated the k-connectivity property of K(n; K , P) under an an/off channel model. There, zeroone laws for the property that the minimum node degree is no less than k and the property that the graph is k-connected were established for H(n; K , P, α), where H(n; K , P, α) := K(n; K , P) ∩ G(n; α). Clearly, our paper extends these results to the heterogeneous setting as we consider the intersection of the inhomogeneous random key graph with ER graph. In particular, with r = 1, i.e., when all nodes belong to the same class and thus receive the same number K of keys, In comparison with the existing literature on similar models, our result can be seen to extend the work by Eletreby and Yagan [41] . Therein, the authors established a zero-one law for the 1-connectivity of K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) ∩ G(n; α), i.e., for a WSN under the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme and on-off channel model. Although these results from a crucial starting point towards the analysis of the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme, they do not guarantee that the WSN would remain connected when sensors fail due to battery depletion or get captured by an adversary. Moreover, the results in [41] are not applicable for mobile WSNs since the mobility of even a single sensor may render the network disconnected. The results established here fill these gaps by establishing k-connectivity results.
Our paper also generalizes the work by Yagan [15] who considered the inhomogeneous random key graph K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) under full visibility; i.e., when all pairs of nodes have a communication channel in between. There, Yagan established zero-one laws for the absence of isolated nodes (i.e., absence of nodes with degree zero) and 1-connectivity. Our work generalizes Yagan's results on two fronts. Firstly, we consider more practical WSN scenarios where the unreliability of wireless communication channels are taken into account through the on/off channel model. Secondly, in addition to the properties that the graph has no isolated nodes (i.e., the minimum node degree is no less than 1) and is 1-connected, we consider general minimum node degree and connectivity values, k = 0, 1, . . . .
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We now present numerical results to support Theorems 1 and 2 in the finite node regime. Moreover, we also verify the validity of our claim that the on/off channel model serves as a good approximation of the disk model. In all experiments, we fix the number of nodes at n = 500 and the size of the key pool at P = 10 4 .
To compare the connectivity behavior of the heterogeneous key predistribution scheme under the disk model with that of the on-off channel model, consider 500 nodes distributed uniformly and independently over a folded unit square [0, 1] 2 with toroidal (continuous) boundary conditions. Since there are no border effects, we get
whenever ρ < 0.5. Thus, in order to match the two communication models G(n; α) and I(n; ρ), we set α = πρ 2 . Now, recall that H(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ, α) = K(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ) ∩ G(n; α), and let H(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ, ρ) = K(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ) ∩ I(n; ρ). In what follows, we present several simulation results comparing the (empirical) probabilities that H and H are k-connected, respectively. In our first set of experiments, we consider the channel parameters α = πρ 2 = 0.2, α = πρ 2 = 0.4, α = πρ 2 = 0.6, and α = πρ 2 = 0.8, while varying the parameter K 1 , i.e., the smallest key ring size, from 10 to 40. The number of classes is fixed to 2, with μ μ μ = {0.5, 0.5}. For each value of K 1 , we set
, we generate 1000 independent samples of the graphs H and H, and count the number of times (out of a possible 1000) that the obtained graphs i) have minimum node degree no less than 2 and ii) are 2-connected. Dividing the counts by 1000, we obtain the (empirical) probabilities for the events of interest. In all cases considered here, we observe that H (resp. H) is 2-connected whenever it has minimum node degree no less than 2 yielding the same empirical probability for both events. This supports the fact that the properties of k-connectivity and minimum node degree being larger than k are asymptotically equivalent in H.
The results obtained for the empirical probabilities of 2-connectivity are depicted in Figure 1 , where lines represent the results under the on-off model (i.e., H), while symbols represent the results under the disk model (i.e., H). In all cases, we see that empirical probabilities are almost identical, supporting the claim that the on/off channel model serves as Empirical probability that H(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ, α) and H(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ, ρ) are 2-connected as a function of K K K for α = πρ 2 = 0.2, α = πρ 2 = 0.4, α = πρ 2 = 0.6, and α = πρ 2 = 0.8 with n = 500 and P = 10 4 ; in each case, the empirical probability value is obtained by averaging over 1000 experiments. Vertical dashed lines correspond to the critical values of K 1 obtained from (13) . a good approximation of the disk model (under α = πρ 2 ). More importantly, this shows that our main results are likely to hold also under the disk communication model. For each curve in Figure 1 , we also show the critical threshold of connectivity "predicted" by Theorem 2 by a vertical dashed line. More specifically, the vertical dashed lines stand for the minimum integer value of K 1 that satisfies
with any given k and α. We see from Figure 1 that the probability of k-connectivity transitions from zero to one within relatively small variations in K 1 . Moreover, the critical values of K 1 obtained by (13) lie within the transition interval.
In Figure 2 , we consider four different values for k, namely we set k = 4, k = 6, k = 8, and k = 10 while varying K 1 from 10 to 40 and fixing α = πρ 2 = 0.4. The number of classes is fixed to 2 with μ μ μ = {0.5, 0.5} and we set K 2 = K 1 + 5 for each value of K 1 . Using the same procedure that produced Figure 1 , we obtain the empirical probability that H and H are k-connected versus K 1 . The critical threshold of connectivity asserted by Theorem 2 is again shown by a vertical dashed line. Again, we see that numerical results are in parallel with Theorem 2, and that the k-connectivity behaviors of H and H are very close to each other. Figure 3 is generated in a similar manner with Figure 1 , this time with an eye towards understanding the impact of the minimum key ring size K 1 on network connectivity. To that end, we fix the number of classes at 2 with μ μ μ = {0.5, 0.5} and consider four different key ring sizes K K K each with mean 40;
We compare the probability of 2-connectivity in the resulting networks while varying α (and consequently πρ 2 ) from zero to one. We see that although the average number of keys per sensor is kept constant in all four cases, network connectivity improves dramatically as the minimum key ring Empirical probability that H(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ, α) and H(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ, ρ) are k-connected as a function of K 1 for k = 4, k = 6, k = 8, and k = 10, with n = 500 and P = 10 4 ; in each case, the empirical probability value is obtained by averaging over 1000 experiments. Vertical dashed lines stand for the critical threshold of connectivity asserted by Theorem 2. Fig. 3 . Empirical probability that H(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ, α) and H(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ, ρ) are 2-connected with n = 500, μ μ μ = (1/2, 1/2), and P = 10 4 ; we consider four choices of K K K = (K 1 , K 2 ) each with the same mean.
size K 1 increases; e.g., with α = πρ 2 = 0.2, the probability of connectivity is one when K 1 = K 2 = 40 while it drops to zero if we set K 1 = 10 while increasing K 2 to 70 so that the mean key ring size is still 40. Once again, we see that the results under the on-off model are very similar to those obtained under the disk model. In fact, Figure 3 suggests that our work can be useful in determining the minimum transmission radius ρ needed to achieve a certain probability of k-connectivity in the network; e.g., to guarantee 2-connectivity almost surely with K 1 = 20 and K 2 = 60 (with other parameters as in the caption of Figure 3 ), we need to have at least πρ 2 = 0.38.
In Figure 4 , we examine the reliability of H(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ, α) by looking at the probability of 1-connectivity as the number of deleted (i.e., failed) nodes increases. From a mobility perspective, this is equivalent to investigating the probability of a WSN remaining connected as the number of mobile sensors leaving the network increases. We set n = 500, μ μ μ = {1/2, 1/2}, α = 0.4, P = 10 4 , and select K 1 and K 2 = K 1 + 10 from (13) for k = 8, k = 10, k = 12, and k = 14. With these settings, we would expect (for very large n) the network to remain connected whp after the deletion of up to 7, 9, 11, and 13 nodes, respectively. Using the same Fig. 4 . Empirical probability that H(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ, α) remains connected after deleting nodes from the minimum vertex cut set. We fix n = 500, μ μ μ = (1/2, 1/2), α = 0.4, P = 10 4 , and choose K 1 and K 2 = K 1 + 10 from (13) for each k = 8, k = 10, k = 12, and k = 14; i.e., we use K 1 = 30, 33, 36, 38, respectively.
procedure that produced Figure 1 , we obtain the empirical probability that H(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ, α) is connected as a function of the number of deleted nodes 2 in each case. We see that even with n = 500 nodes, the resulting reliability is close to the levels expected to be attained asymptotically as n goes to infinity. In particular, we see that the probability of remaining connected when (k − 1) nodes leave the network is around 0.75 for the first two cases and around 0.90 for the other two cases.
Finally, we provide a simulation study that characterizes the effect of network size n on the probability of k-connectivity. Our objective is to observe the influence of n on the behavior of the probability of k-connectivity. In Figure 5 , we examine the probability of 4-connectivity of H (n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ, α) as we set P = 10 4 , α = 0.4, vary K 1 from 4 to 40, and set K 2 = K 1 + 5. To characterize the effect of n, we compute the empirical probability for the cases when n = 300, n = 500, n = 1000, and n = 10000. We observe that the probability of connectivity exhibits a sharper transition between 0 and 1 as we increase n, which is expected by virtue of Theorem 3.2 that provides sharp zero-one law in the limit of large network size. In addition, we observe that as we increase n, the fraction log n+(k−1) log log n n decreases, leading to a decrease on the critical value of K 1,n needed to ensure k-connectivity (for fixed P, α, and K 2 .).
V. OTHER APPLICATION AREAS: A NOVEL MODEL FOR SPREADING PROCESSES ON COMPLEX NETWORKS
Complex networks denote a class of real-world networks that exhibit non-trivial structural properties that are neither purely regular nor purely random [42] . Examples of complex networks include brain networks [43] , the World Wide Web [44] , transportation networks [45] , and indeed, social networks [46] . Spreading processes, such as information [47] , [48] or infectious disease [49] , [50] propagation, are Fig. 5 . Empirical probability that H(n; μ μ μ, θ θ θ, α) is 4-connected as a function of K 1 for n = 300, n = 500, n = 1000, and n = 10000, with P = 10 4 ; in each case, the empirical probability value is obtained by averaging over 1000 experiments. Highlighted symbols correspond to the critical values of K 1 obtained from (13) .
fundamental phenomena occurring in complex networks. The study of spreading processes on complex networks is significant to our understanding of how information or diseases propagate on a network, and illustrates the delicate interplay between the structure of the network and the dynamics of propagation.
Over the course of the past decade, researchers proposed multiple generative models to create networks that resemble the structure of real-world complex networks, allowing for large-scale simulations and predictions of how a spreading process would behave in real-life. The inhomogeneous random key graph K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) (presented herein solely from a security perspective) can also be seen as a useful and natural generative model for real-world common-interest social networks. A common interest relationship between two friends manifests from their selection of common interests or hobbies from a large pool [51] . This can be modeled by an inhomogeneous random key graph, where each individual has a set of interests (possibly of different sizes) sampled from a large pool of interests and two individuals are connected if they happen to share an interest. Moreover, this model generates networks that are highly clustered, have small diameter [52] (hence, smallworld [53] ), and with tunable degree distribution [54] , making it a very plausible and intuitive model for real-world social networks. In fact, most real-world social networks were shown to be highly clustered and have small diameter [44] , [53] .
The intersection model H(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P, α) considered here can be useful in studying the propagation of epidemics or information on complex networks as well. A simple model for the spread of epidemics (or information) on complex networks is the so called Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model. Therein, a disease is transmitted to a susceptible individual upon contact with an infected individual. Later on, infected individuals recover from the disease and gain immunity from it. The outbreak size is precisely the number of recovered individuals at the steady state. This model results in reasonable predictions for the cases where recovery grants lasting resistance. In [50] , it was shown that under some conditions, the dynamics of the SIR model on a given network maps to a bond-percolation problem with the average transmissibility of the disease as the percolation parameter. Namely, with α being the average transmissibility, if we are to occupy each edge in the graph with probability α, the final outbreak size would be the size of the cluster of vertices that can be reached from the initially infected vertex by traversing only the occupied edges [50] . Typically, one is interested in deriving the threshold value of α for which a giant connected component emerges, indicating that the disease has reached a positive fraction of the population.
Intersecting the inhomogeneous random key graph K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) with an ER graph G(n; α) is essentially equivalent to occupying each edge of K(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P) independently with probability α. Hence, the scaling condition for which the one-law of Theorem 2 holds gives us a threshold value of α for which the network becomes k-connected, implying that a strain of a disease or a piece of information would infect the entire population i) no matter which individual starts the process, and ii) even if any k − 1 individuals leave the network (e.g., disease-induced mortality). In particular, letα n := (log n +(k −1) log log n +γ n )/(nλ 1 (n)) (with lim n→∞ γ n = ∞ and under the enforced conditions of the one-law of Theorem 2). If the average transmissibility of a disease α satisfies α n >α n , a single giant component containing all of the vertices emerge (because in this case the network is k-connected by virtue of Theorem 2), allowing the disease to infect every single vertex. Moreover, the giant component would persist even if any k − 1 vertices leave the network. Therefore, our results on the k-connectivity of H(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P, α) provide a threshold on the average transmissibility a disease should have in order to persist in a given population, even when some individuals leave the network, and subsequently cut some of the propagation pathways.
VI. PRELIMINARIES
A number of technical results are collected here for easy referencing.
Proposition 3 [15, Proposition 4.1]: For any scaling K
In view of (4), Proposition 3 implies that
Proposition 4: Consider a scaling
and a scaling α : N 0 → (0, 1). Let the sequence γ : N 0 → R be defined through (6) for each n = 1, 2, . . .. Under (7) and (9), we have
when lim n→∞ γ n = +∞. Proof: From (6), we clearly have
for all n sufficiently large when lim n→∞ γ n = +∞. We also know from [24, Lemmas 7.1 and 7.2] that
where the last bound follows from (5) . This leads to
Combining (17) and (18) we get
log n nα n for all n sufficiently large. Under (7) and (9) 
is monotone decreasing in x for all n sufficiently large.
The conclusion follows since 
We will use several bounds given below throughout the paper:
VII. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. A Roadmap
The proof of Theorem 1 consists of two parts. Namely, in Section VII-B, we establish the one-law part of Theorem 1, while in Section VII-C, we establish the zero-law part. In establishing the one-law part, we utilize the first moment method [55, p.54, eq. (3.1)] to show that under the scaling condition (6) with lim n→∞ γ n = ∞, the number of nodes with degree in H (n; μ μ μ, n ) is zero for = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 with high probability in the limit of large network size. The result implies that the minimum node degree of the graph is no less than k, which establishes the one-law part of Theorem 1.
In establishing the zero-law part, we utilize the second moment method [55, p.54, Remark 3.1 ] to show that under the scaling condition (6) with lim n→∞ γ n = −∞, there exists at least one class-1 node with degree < k with high probability in the limit of large network size, which readily implies that the minimum node degree of the graph is less than k, i.e., the zero-law part of Theorem 1.
B. Establishing the One-Law
The proof of Theorem 1 relies on the method of first and second moments applied to the number of nodes with degree in H(n; μ μ μ, n ). Let X (n; μ μ μ, n ) denote the total number of nodes with degree in H(n; μ μ μ, n ), namely,
The first moment method [55, p. 54, eq. (3.1)] gives
The one-law states that the minimum node degree in H(n; μ μ μ, n ) is no less than k asymptotically almost surely (a.a.s.); i.e., lim n→∞ P [X (n; μ μ μ, n ) = 0] = 1, for all = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. Thus, the one-law will follow if we show that
We let D i, (n; μ μ μ, n ) denote the event that node v i in H(n; μ μ μ, n ) has degree for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Throughout, we simplify the notation by writing
and it follows that
by the exchangeability of the indicator rvs
In view of (25) and (27), we see that (26) and hence the one-law would follow upon showing
We start by deriving the probability of D x, . For any node v x , the events
are mutually independent conditionally on the type t x . It follows from (4) that the degree of a node v x , i.e., D x , is conditionally binomial leading to
Thus, we get
for all n sufficiently large, as we invoke Fact 5 together with (15) , and noting that is a non-negative integer constant and that n−1 ≤ (!) −1 n . Combining (6) and (21), and using the fact that 1 (n) ≤ 1, we see that
When lim n→∞ γ n = ∞, we readily get the desired conclusion (28) . This establishes the one-law.
C. Establishing the Zero-Law
Our approach in establishing the zero-law relies on the method of second moment applied to a variable that counts the number of nodes in H(n; μ μ μ, n ) that are class-1 and with degree . Similar to the discussion given before, we let Y (n; μ μ μ, n ) denote the total number of nodes that are class-1 and with degree in H(n; μ μ μ, n ), namely,
v i is class 1 and has degree in H(n; μ μ μ, n )
Clearly, if we can show that whp there exists at least one class-1 node with a degree strictly less than k under the enforced assumptions (with lim n→∞ γ n = −∞) then the zero-law immediately follows. With a slight abuse of notations, we let D i, (n; μ μ μ, n ) denote the event that node v i in H(n; μ μ μ, n ) is class-1 and has degree for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Throughout, we simplify the notation by writing 
We have E [Y (n; μ μ μ, n )] = nP D x, and
In view of (30) and (31), we will get lim n→∞ P[Y (n; μ μ μ, n ) = 0] = 0, for some = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 (which in turns establishes the zero-law, i.e., P[Minimum node degree ofH(n; μ μ μ,
and
for some = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. The next two results will help establish (32) and (33) along two specific subsequences (on which n 1 (n) has a limit) with a different value of for each particular subsequence. 
Proof: Considering any class-1 node v i , and recalling (4), we know that the events
are mutually independent. Thus, it follows that the degree of a given node v i , conditioned on being class-1, follows a Binomial distribution Bin(n − 1, 1 (n)). Thus, 
(b) For any two distinct nodes v x and v y , we have
Note that the events D x, and D y, already imply that nodes v x and v y are class-1, i.e., | x | = | y | = K 1 . In this case, one may conjecture that the proof of Lemma 8 would precisely follow that of [22, Lemma 3] for the homogeneous case where all nodes receive the same number of keys K 1 . Although the proof does follow that of [22, Lemma 3], we remark that even when we explicitly fix the class of the two particular nodes v x and v y , their adjacent nodes could still belong to any class. Hence, extra effort has to be made to precisely bound the probability that some vertex, say v j , is adjacent to both v x and v y , as v j could be class-i with probability μ i (e.g., see Lemma 19) . Since the proof of Lemma 8 closely (although, not entirely as we mentioned above) follows that of [22, Lemma 3] , it is skipped here for brevity and given in Appendix B for completeness.
We now show why the zero-law follows from Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 by means of establishing (32) and (33) for some = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1. Let
In what follows, we will consider the cases where n 1 (n) = (1) and n 1 (n) = o(1), separately. We will show that: i) when n 1 (n) = (1), conditions (32) and (33) hold for = k − 1, thus we have lim n→∞ P (n; μ μ μ, n ) = 0; ii) when n 1 (n) = o(1), conditions (32) and (33) hold for = 0, hence we have lim n→∞ P (n; μ μ μ, n ) = 0. Collectively, we have lim n→∞ P (n; μ μ μ, n ) = 0 whenever
. By virtue of the subsubsequence principle [55, p. 12] , this readily implies that lim n→∞ P (n; μ μ μ, n ) = 0 holds even when the sequence n 1 (n) does not have a limit.
1) The Case Where There Exists an > 0 Such That n 1 (n) > for All n Sufficiently Large: In this case we will establish (32) and (33) 
for each = 0, 1, . . .. Setting = k − 1 and substituting (6) into (37), we get
and note that (log n + (k − 1) log log n + γ n ) ≥ for all n sufficiently large by virtue of the fact that n 1 (n) > . Fix n sufficiently large, pick ζ ∈ (0, 1) and consider the cases when γ n ≤ −(1 − ζ ) log n and γ n > −(1 − ζ ) log n, separately. In the former case, we get
and in the latter case, we get
Thus, for all n sufficiently large, we have
It is now clear that
since ζ ∈ (0, 1) and lim n→∞ γ n = −∞. Reporting (39) into (38), we establish (32). Furthermore, from Lemma 7 and Lemma 8, it is clear that (33) follows for = k − 1.
2) The Case Where li m n→∞ n 1 (n) = 0: In this case, we will establish (32) and (33) 
VIII. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
A. A Roadmap
The proof of Theorem 2 consists of two parts. Namely, in Section VIII-B, we establish the zero-law part of Theorem 2, while in Section VIII-C, we establish the one-law part. In establishing the zero-law part, we note that if the minimum node degree of a graph is strictly less than k, then the graph is certainly not k-connected. This follows from the fact that for a k-connected graph, there is no node with degree strictly less than k. The aforementioned observation indicates the zero-law part of Theorem 1 already implies the zerolaw part of Theorem 2. The proof of the one-law part of Theorem 2 consists of several steps. The crux of the proof lies in showing that the probability of the vertex connectivity of H (n; μ μ μ, n ) being is zero for = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 in the limit of large network size. Specifically, we derive an upper bound on the probability of vertex connectivity being (for = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1) and show that each term appearing in the upper bound approaches zero as n tends to infinity under the scaling condition (6) with lim n→∞ γ n = ∞.
B. Establishing the Zero-Law
Let κ denote the vertex connectivity of H(n; μ μ μ, n ), i.e., the minimum number of nodes to be deleted to make the graph disconnected. Also, let δ denote the minimum node degree in H(n; μ μ μ, n ). It is clear that if a random graph is k-connected, meaning that κ ≥ k, then it does not have any node with degree less than k.
immediately follows. In view of (40), we obtain the zero-law for k-connectivity, i.e., that
when lim n→∞ γ n = −∞ from the zero-law part of Theorem 1. Put differently, the conditions that lead to the zero-law part of Theorem 1, i.e., λ 1 (n) = o(1) and lim n→∞ γ n = −∞, automatically lead to the zero-law part of Theorem 2.
C. Establishing the One-Law
Before we proceed with the proof of the one-law of Theorem 2, we take a moment to explain why the probabilistic bounds that we derive next look substantially different than those given in [22] for the homogeneous case. In establishing the zero-law of Theorem 1, it was sufficient to show that there exists at least one node of class-1 with degree less than k to prove that the minimum node degree is less than k with high probability. As we fixed the key ring size of the node(s) under consideration, the heterogeneity partially vanished, rendering our probabilistic bounds closely related to the ones given in [22] , except for some cases, as discussed in Section VII-C. However, as we establish the one-law of Theorem 2, the heterogeneity of the key ring sizes comes into play, leading to considerably more difficult expressions and substantially different bounds than the ones given in [22] for the homogeneous case. This will become apparent in Sections IX and X, where we prove a key result that establishes the one-law for k-connectivity.
An important step towards establishing the one-law of Theorem 2 is presented in Appendix C. There, we show that it suffices to establish the one law in Theorem 2 under the additional condition that γ n = o (log n), which leads to a number of useful consequences. Let a sequence β ,n : N × N 0 → R be defined through the relation
for each n ∈ N 0 and ∈ N. Put differently, we have β ,n := n 1 (n) − log n − log log n, n = 1, 2, . . .
where as in (4), 1 (n) is given by
In view of the arguments in Appendix C, the one-law (10) follows from the next result.
Theorem 9: Let be a non-negative constant integer. Under (7), (8) , (9) , and (41) with β ,n = o (log n) and lim n→∞ β ,n = +∞, we have
Before we give a formal proof, we first explain why the one-law (10) follows from Theorem 9. Comparing (41) with (6) and noting that γ n = o (log n), we get
Moreover, for = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1, we have
by recalling the fact that lim n→∞ γ n = +∞. Recalling (42) and (43), we notice that the conditions needed for Theorem 9 are met when = 0, 1, . . . , k − 1; thus, we have
e., the one-law.
We now give a road map to the proof of Theorem 9. By a simple union bound, we get
It is now immediate that Theorem 9 is established once we show that
under the enforced assumptions of Theorem 9. We start by establishing (44) . Following the analysis of Section VII-B, it is easy to see that
,n e − log log n−β ,n , and it follows that lim n→∞ nP D x, = 0 as long as lim n→∞ β ,n = +∞. From (25) and (27) , this yields
However, from (41) it is easy to see that β ,n is monotonically decreasing in . Thus, the fact that lim n→∞ β ,n = +∞ for some implies 
. , , or equivalently (44).
We now focus on establishing (45) under the enforced assumptions of Theorem 9. The proof is based on finding a tight upper bound on the probability P [(κ = ) ∩ δ > ] and showing that this bound goes to zero as n goes to infinity. Let N denote the collection of all non-empty subsets of {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n }. Define N * = {T : T ∈ N , |T | ≥ 2} and
encodes the event that for at least one |T | = 2, . . . , n, the total number of distinct keys held by at least one set of |T | sensors is less than or equal to J |T | . Now, define
and let
for some chosen arbitrarily in (0, 1) and for some ζ, ψ in (0, 1) to be specified later at (49) and (50), respectively. A crude bounding argument gives
Hence, establishing (45) consists of establishing the following two results.
Proposition 10: Let be a non-negative constant integer. Assume that (41) holds with β ,n > 0, and that we have (8) and (9) . Also, assume that (7) holds such that P n ≥ σ n for some σ > 0 for all n sufficiently large. Then
where J J J is as defined in (48) with arbitrary ∈ (0, 1), constant ζ ∈ (0,
and ψ ∈ (0,
Proof:
The proof follows the same steps with [15, Proposition 7.2] to show that it suffices to establish Proposition 10 for the homogenous case where all key rings are of the same size K 1,n . This is evident upon realizing that
where denotes the usual stochastic ordering. After this reduction, the proof reduces to [22, Proposition 4.1]. The proof only require conditions (7), (16) , and K 1,n = o(P n ) to hold. We note that K 1,n = o(P n ) follows from (8) and the fact that K 1,n ≤ K r,n . Also, (16) follows under the enforced assumptions as shown in Proposition 4.
Proposition 11: Let be a non-negative constant integer. Under (7) , (8) , (9) , and (41) with β ,n = o (log n) and lim n→∞ β ,n = +∞, we have
The proof of Proposition 11 is given in Section IX. Proposition 10 and Proposition 11 establish (45) which, combined with (44), establish Theorem 9. We recall that Theorem 9 establishes the one-law.
IX. PROOF OF PROPOSITION 11
For notational simplicity, we denote H(n; μ μ μ, K K K , P, α) by H. Let H(U ) be a subgraph of H restricted to the vertex set U . For any subset of nodes U , define U c := {v 1 , . . . , v n } \ U . We also let N U c denote the collection of all non-empty subsets of {v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n } \ U . We note that a subset T of N U c is isolated in H(U c ) if there are no edges in H between nodes in T and nodes in U c \ T , i.e.,
Next, we present key observations that pave the way to establishing Proposition 11. If κ = but δ > , then there exists subsets U and T of nodes with U ∈ N , |U | = , T ∈ N U c , |T | ≥ 2 such that H(T ) is connected while T is isolated in H(U c ). This ensures that H can be disconnected by deleting a properly selected set of nodes, i.e., the set U . This would not be possible for sets T ∈ N U c with |T | = 1 since we have δ ≥ + 1 which implies that the single node in T is connected to at least one node in U c \ T . Finally, having κ = ensures that H remains connected after removing (−1) nodes. Then, if there exists a subset U with |U | = such that some T ∈ N U c is isolated in H(U c ), each node in U must be connected to at least one node in T and at least one node in U c \ T . This can be proved by contradiction. Consider subsets U ∈ N with |U | = , and T ∈ N U c with |T | ≥ 2, such that T is isolated from U c \ T . Suppose there exists a node v i ∈ U such that v i is adjacent to at least one node in T but not adjacent to any node in U c \T . In this case, it is easy to see that there are no edges between nodes in U c \ T and nodes in {v i } ∘ T . Thus, the graph could have been made disconnected by removing nodes in U \ {v i }. But |U \ {v i }| = − 1, and this contradicts the fact that κ = .
We now present several events that characterize the aforementioned observations. For each non-empty subset T ⊆ U c , we define C T as the event that H(T ) is itself connected, and D U,T as the event that T is isolated in H(U c ), i.e.,
Moreover, we define B U,T as the event that each node in U is adjacent to at least one node in T , i.e.,
and finally, we let A U,T := B U,T ∩ D U,T ∩ C T . It is clear that A U,T encodes the event that H(T ) is itself connected, each node in U is adjacent to at least one node in T , but T is isolated in H(U c ). The aforementioned observations enable us to express the event [(κ = ) ∩ (δ > )] in terms of the event sequence
A U,T . In particular, we have
with N n, denoting the collection of all subsets of {v 1 , . . . , v n } with exactly elements. We also note that the union need only to be taken over all subsets T with 2 ≤ |T | ≤ # n− 2 $ . This is because if the vertices in T form a component then so do the vertices in N U c \ T . Now, using a standard union bound, we obtain 
and the key bound
is readily obtained upon noting that |N n, | = n and |N U c ,m | = n− m . Thus, Proposition 11 will be established if we show that
We now derive bounds for the probabilities
where ν m, j is defined as ν m, j := {i = + 1, . . . , + m : C i j } for each j = 1, . . . , and j = m++1, . . . , n. Put differently, ν m, j is the set of indices in i = + 1, . . . , + m for which nodes v j and v i are adjacent in the ER graph G(n; α n ). Then, (52) follows from the fact that for v j to be isolated from {v +1 , . . . , v +m } in H, j needs to be disjoint from each of the key rings { i : i ∈ ν m, j }. Now, using the law of iterated expectation, we get with parameters m and α, while || is a rv that takes the value K j with probability μ j . Next, we bound the probabilities P B ,m . We know that 
by independence of the random variables ν m, j and | j | for j = 1, . . . , .
We note that, on the event E(J J J ), we have
and it is always the case that |∘ i∈ν m i | ≥
Next, we define
Using (56) in (53) and (55) in (54), we get (57) since C m is fully determined by the rvs +1 , . . . , +m and {C i j , i, j = + 1, . . . , + m} while B ,m , D ,m , and E(J J J ) are independent from {C i j , i, j = + 1, . . . , + m}. Here, we also used the fact that given { +1 , . . . , +m }, D ,m is independent from B ,m .
The following lemma provides upper bounds for (57).
Lemma 12: Let J J J be defined as in (48) for some ∈ (0, 1), (1) and (7), (8) , and (9) hold. Then for all n sufficiently large, and for each m = 2, 3, . . . , n, we have (58) , as shown at the bottom of this page.
The proof of Lemma 12 is given in Appendix D. Now, the proof of Proposition 11 will be completed upon establishing (51) by means of Lemma 12. We devote Section X to establishing (51).
X. ESTABLISHING (51)
A. A Roadmap
Our objective is to establish (51) using the bounds given by Lemma 12. We start by defining f n,,m as
Thus, establishing (51) becomes equivalent to showing
Our approach is to establish (59) in several steps with each step focusing on a specific range of m. In particular, we can write 
where M is an integer to be specified later at (70) and ν ∈ 0, 1 2 is to be specified later at (76). In establishing (59), we will show that each term appearing in (60) approaches zero as n tends to infinity using the bounds given by Lemma 12. This will be established in Section X-B through Section X-F, where we use different approaches and utilize different bounds from Lemma 12 to show that each term appearing in (60) approaches zero as n tends to infinity. Finally, in this section, we make use of the following lemma several times.
Lemma 13: Consider a scaling
and a scaling α : N 0 → (0, 1) such that (41) holds with β ,n = o(log n). We have 1 2
for all n sufficiently large, i.e., α n p 1r (n) = log n n . If in addition (9) holds, we have
The proof of Lemma 13 is given in Appendix E. We now proceed with establishing (51) . Throughout, we consider scalings K 1 , . . . , K r , P : N 0 → N r+1 0 and α : N 0 → (0, 1) such that (41) holds with lim n→∞ β ,n = +∞ and β ,n = o(log n), and (7), (8), (9) hold. We will make repeated use of the bounds (22), (23), (24), and (62).
B. The Case Where 2 ≤ m ≤ M
This range considers fixed values of m. Pick an integer M to be specified later at (70). We note that on this range we have m ≤ P n −K r,n 2 K r,n for all n sufficiently large by virtue of (8) .
On the same range we also have
by virtue of (62), (20) , and the fact that m is bounded.
Using (24), (58), (62), and (64), and noting that 1 (n) = o (1) under (41) with β ,n = o(log n), we get
2 )(log n+ log log n+β ,n )
since is non-negative integer constant, m is bounded, and lim n→∞ β ,n = +∞. This establishes On the range considered here, we have from (22), (24), and (58) that 
From the upper bound in (61) and the fact that m ≤ μ r n 2ζ log n for all n sufficiently large, we have α n p 1r (n)ζ m ≤ 2 log n μ r n ζ μ r n 2ζ log n = 1.
Using the fact that 1 − e −x ≥ x 2 for all 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, we get
as we invoke (20) and the lower bound in (61). Reporting this last bound and (62) into (65), and noting that
we get 
Thus, the geometric series in (68) is summable for n sufficiently large, and we have
12 (e log n) 2(M+1) and it follows that 
This choice is permissible given that ζ, μ r > 0.
D. The Case Where min{
μ r n 2ζ log n , m n } < m ≤ μ r n 2ζ log n Clearly, this range becomes obsolete if m n ≥ μ r n 2ζ log n . Thus, it suffices to consider the subsequences for which the range m n + 1 ≤ m ≤ μ r n 2ζ log n is non-empty. On this range, following the same arguments that lead to (65) and (68) gives
where in the last step we used (66) in view of m ≤ μ r n 2ζ log n . Next, we write e −ζ mμ r log n
where the last inequality is obtained from m ≤ μ r n 2ζ log n . Using the fact that m > m n = min{ P n K 1,n , n 2 } and that P n ≥ σ n for some σ > 0 under (7), we have
by virtue of (16) and the facts that ζ, μ r , σ > 0. Reporting this into (72), we see that for for any ε > 0, there exists a finite integer n * (ε) such that e −ζ mμ r log n
for all n ≥ n * (ε). Using (73) in (71), we get
Similar to (69), we have e (log n) 2 e −ζ μ r log n 12 (1−ε) = o(1) so that the sum in (74) converges for n sufficiently large.
Following a similar approach to that in Section X-C, we then see that
since lim n→∞ m n = ∞ under the enforced assumptions.
E. The Case Where
μ r n 2ζ log n + 1 ≤ m ≤ νn We consider μ r n 2ζ log n + 1 ≤ m ≤ νn for some ν ∈ 0, 1 2 to be specified later at (76). Recalling (22), (24), (58), (61), and (67), and noting that n m is monotone increasing in m
for all n sufficiently large. We have 1 − μ r + μ r e − μr 4 < 1 from μ r > 0 and e −ψ K 1,n = o(1) from (16) . Also, it holds that lim ν→0 e ν 3ν = 1. Thus, if we pick ν small enough to ensure that e
then for any 0 < ε < 1 − (e/ν)
Reporting this into (75), we get (23), (24), (58), and (67) to get
Noting that ζ, ν, ψ > 0 and recalling (63) and the lower bound of (61), we get
for some sequence w n satisfying lim n→∞ w n = +∞. It is now obvious that e −ζ νnα n p 11 (n) = o (1) . Moreover, we have
immediately follows and the proof of one-law is completed.
XI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have investigated the secure and reliable connectivity of wireless sensor networks secured by the heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme under an on/off channel model. The heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme induced an inhomogeneous random key graph, denoted K (n; μ μ μ, K K K , P), while the on/off channel model induced an Erdős-Rényi graph, denoted G (n; α). Hence, we modeled the overall network by the intersection of both graphs, denoted H (n; μ μ μ, K K K , P, α). Namely, two vertices v i and v j are adjacent in H (n; μ μ μ, K K K , P, α) if i) they share a cryptographic key and ii) have a communication channel in between that is on. We have presented conditions on how to scale the parameter of the intersection model H (n; μ μ μ, K K K , P, α) so that i) the minimum node degree of the graph is no less than k (see Theorem 1), and ii) the graph is k-connected (see Theorem 2), both with high probability in the limit of large network size. We then proceeded by presenting numerical results that supported our theorems in the finitenode regime. Moreover, we demonstrated via simulations that our results are also useful when the on/off channel model is replaced with the more realistic disk communication model.
As for future work, we plan to generalize the simple on/off channel model to the heterogeneous on/off channel model, where the communication channel between a class-i node and a class-j node is on with probability α i j , giving rise to the inhomogeneous Erdős-Rényi graph, denoted G (n; μ μ μ, α α α).
Investigating the security and reliability of wireless sensor networks secured by the heterogeneous random key predistribution scheme under a heterogeneous on/off channel model amounts to investigating the k-connectivity of the intersection model H (n; μ μ μ,
The heterogeneous on/off channel model offers a more realistic channel model, where the channel availability between two nodes becomes dependent on their classes. This could model the cases where nodes of a particular class are empowered with more advanced radio interface, or are deployed in areas which are severely jammed by an adversary. In other words, the heterogeneous on/off channel model offers a degree of freedom in designing a suitable channel availability matrix α α α that captures real-world scenarios. Indeed, such a degree of freedom is absent in the simple on/off channel model that we have used throughout our paper. We note that we have investigated the properties of 1-connecitivity and the absence of isolated nodes of H (n; μ μ μ, K K K , P, α α α) in [33] and [56] , respectively.
APPENDIX A ADDITIONAL PRELIMINARIES
Proposition 14: Consider a random variable Z defined as
Proof: We start by showing that under (5), the quantity p i j (n) is increasing in both i and j . Fix n = 2, 3, . . . and recall that under (5), K i increases as i increases. For any i, j such that K i + K j > P, we see from (2) that p i j (n) = 1; otherwise if K i + K j ≤ P, we have p i j (n) < 1. Given that K i + K j increases with both i and j , it will be sufficient to show that p i j (n) increases with both i and j on the range where K i + K j < P. On that range, we have
K j decreases with both K i and K j , hence with i and j . From (2), it follows that p i j (n) increases with i and j . As a consequence, with Z = 1 − p 1i , we have
From Popoviciu's inequality [57, p. 9] , we see that
Proposition 15 [15, Proposition 4.4] : For any set of positive integers K 1 , . . . , K r , P and any scalar a ≥ 1, we have
Proof: Recalling (3), we obtain
under the given assumption that Then, 1 − x a ≤ a(1 − x) . Proof: By a crude bounding, we have (a) We have
Proof: We know that
It is easy to see that
Similarly, it is easy to see that
Next, by recalling (A.1), we observe that
where Z n (μ μ μ, θ θ θ n ) is a rv that takes the value 1 − p 1i (n) with probability μ i for i = 1, . . . , r . Note that
for positive μ μ μ. Recalling Proposition 14, and using (A.8) and (A.9) in (A.7), we get
The desired conclusion (A.2) follows from (A.4) in view of (A.5), (A.6), and (A.10). Proof of part (b) of the lemma is very similar to that of [22, Lemma 9] , and therefore is skipped here for brevity.
Lemma 20: Consider a scaling K 1 , . . . , K r , P :
, with lim n→∞ γ n = −∞. Let m 1 , m 2 , and m 3 be non-negative integer constants. We define event F as follows.
with j distinct from x and y. Proof: The proof of Lemma 20 is very similar with [22, Lemma 4] ; in fact, it would follow directly from [22, eqs. (212) and (213)] if we show that
Recalling Lemma 19 and the fact that 1 (n) ≤ log n+(k−1) log log n n for all n sufficiently large under lim n→∞ γ n = −∞, we get
Also,
Invoking Fact 6 for (A.13), and using (A.14) and (A.15), we get
This gives (A.12) and Lemma 20 is established in view of [22, Lemma 4] . Lemma 21 [22, Lemma 10] : If P n ≥ 2 K 1,n , we have
The law of total probability gives 
(b) For any two distinct nodes v x and v y , we have (1) and (6) holds with lim n→∞ γ n = −∞. If n 1 (n) = (1), then for any non-negative integer and any distinct nodes v x and v y , we have
We establish Propositions 22 and 23 in the following two subsections respectively. First, we explain why Lemma 8 follows from Propositions 22 and 23. If n 1 (n) = (1), then for any non-negative integer constant , we observe that (35) follows from (B.2) and (B.4) in view of (B.1). Now, considering the case when = 0, we see that (B.3) directly implies (36) by virtue of (B.1) and the fact that P D x,0 ∩ D y,0 ∩ E xy = 0 since it is impossible for nodes v x and v y to be adjacent to each other (i.e., under E xy ) when both nodes have zero degree.
A. Proof of Proposition 22
We start by defining the series of events A h as follows
Recall that D i, denotes the event that node v i in H(n; μ μ μ, ) is class-1 and has degree for each i = 1, 2, . . . , n. It is simple to see that
whence we get
since the events {A h , h = 0, . . . , } are mutually exclusive.
we have under t x = t y = 1 that
where we define the event X u as
Now, we get
by virtue of (B.6) and the fact that the events K xy , X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X K 1,n are mutually disjoint. Combining (B.5) and (B.8) we obtain
Proposition 22 is established by virtue of (B.9) and the following two results.
Proposition 24: (1) and (6) holds with lim n→∞ γ n = −∞. Then for any non-negative integer , we have h=0 (1) and (6) holds with
for any = 0, 1, . . .. Furthermore, we have (B.11) for = 0 without requiring the condition n 1 (n) = (1).
Before we prove Propositions 24 and 25, we explain why Proposition 22 follows from these two results.
Combining (B.10) and (B.11) we establish (B.2) in view of (B.9). Furthermore, by using (B.10) and (B.11) with = 0, we readily obtain (B.3) in view of (B.9). This establishes Proposition 22.
1) Proof for Proposition 24:
We write
where
under the assumption λ 1 (n) = o(1) and Fact 16. Also, using Lemma 20 with u = 0, m 1 = h, and m 2 = m 3 = −h, we see that
Next, we evaluate the three probability terms appearing in (B.14). We know that
by virtue of Lemma 19. We also see that
as we invoke (B.15) and use the fact that 1 (n) = o(1) under lim n→∞ γ n = −∞. It is also easy to see that
via similar arguments.
For h = 1, 2, . . . , , we observe from (B.14), (B.15), (B.16), and (B.17) that
Similarly, setting h = 0, we obtain
19)
The conclusion (B.10) follows by combining (B.13), (B.18), (B.19), and noting that is constant.
2) Proof of Proposition 25: Our approach is to find an upper bound on the left hand side of (B.11) and show that this upper bound is o h=0 P A h ∩ K xy t x = 1, t y = 1 . It will be clear that the condition n 1 (n) = (1) needed to establish (B.11) is not needed for the case when = 0. We know that
Now, since E x j = C x j ∩K x j and E yj = C yj ∩K yj , it is clear that E x j and E yj are each independent of the event |S xy | = u. It follows that
Similarly, we have 
for all n sufficiently large. Thus, we get
Note that (B.24) follows trivially for = 0 with no condition on n 1 (n). Combining (B.23), (B.24) and Lemma 21, we get
In view of Proposition 24 (and the fact that is constant), we will immediately establish the desired result (B.11) from (B.25) if we show that
Next, we establish (B.26). From (5), we get for all n sufficiently large that
where the last bound used the fact that 
Thus, for all n sufficiently large, we get
Now, with 1 (n) ≤ log n+(k−1) log log n n for all n sufficiently large under lim n→∞ γ n = −∞, we see that
for all n sufficiently large. Combining (B.27) and (B.28) and the fact that K 1,n ≥ 2, we obtain
Next, we define F(n) = λ 1 (n)e 3 4 α n log n . Fix n sufficiently large such that (B.27) and (B.28) hold. We consider the cases when α n ≤ 1 log n and α n > 1 log n . In the former case, F(n) ≤ λ 1 (n)e 3/4 follows directly. In the latter case we use (B.28) to get
log n nα n e 3 4 α n log n ≤ 3 2
by virtue of the fact that α n log n ≤ log n. Combining the two bounds, we have 
B. Proof of Proposition 23
Recalling Proposition 25 and (B.9), Proposition 23 will follow if we show that
for each = 1, . . .. To establish (B.30), we define the series of events B h as follows
for each h = 0, 1, . . . , − 1. Now, it is easy to see that
Note that h varies from 0 to −1 in (B.31) because given the event E xy , nodes x and y are adjacent; thus, they could have at most − 1 nodes in common when their degrees are . Since the events B h are mutually exclusive for h = 0, . . . , − 1, we get
Thus, the proof of Proposition 23 will be completed upon showing
under the enforced assumptions of Proposition 23, namely, with lim n→∞ γ n = −∞, and n 1 (n) = (1). Proceeding as before, and noting that P[E xy ] = α n P[K xy ] we write
Next, by recalling Lemma 20 with
Recalling (B.20), (B.21), and (B.22), we get
for all n sufficiently large. Using (B.34) in (B.33), we get for all n sufficiently large that In this section, we show that establishing the one-law of Theorem 2 under the additional constraint
establishes the one-law for the case when that additional constraint is not present. Namely, we will show that for any scaling that satisfies conditions (7), (8), (9), and (6) with lim n→∞ γ n = +∞, there exists a scaling that satisfies the same conditions with lim n→∞ γ n = +∞ and γ n = o(log n), such that the probability of k-connectivity under the latter scaling (with γ n = o(log n)) is less than or equal to that under the former scaling. Firstly, consider a probability distribution μ μ μ = {μ 1 , . . . , μ r } with
, and a scaling α * :
, and
and that we have lim n→∞ γ * n = +∞; i.e., the * -scaling satisfies all conditions enforced by part (b) of Theorem 2. Now, with the same distribution μ μ μ, consider a scalinĝ (2) and (3) and also that
Next, letγ n := min γ * n , log log n and defineα n througĥ
Clearly, we haveγ n = o(log n) and lim n→∞γn = +∞. This establishes that for any scaling satisfying the conditions of part (b) of Theorem 2, there exists another scaling (with the same μ μ μ, K K K n , and P n ) that satisfies all of the same conditions and (C.1). In addition, this latter scaling has a smaller probability of a channel being on than the original scaling; i.e., we havê α n ≤ α * n , n = 2, 3, . . .
by virtue of the fact thatγ n ≤ γ * n for all n.
In view of the above, we will establish that part (b) of Theorem 2 under γ n = o(log n) implies Theorem 2 if we show that P H(n; μ μ μ,
This is clear since (C.6) would ensure that if H(n; μ μ μ,K K K n ,P n ,α n ) is k-connected asymptotically almost surely (as would be deduced from Theorem 2 under γ n = o(log n)), then so would H(n; μ μ μ, K K K * n , P * n , α * n ). In view of (C.5), we get (C.6) by means of an easy coupling argument showing that H(n; μ μ μ,K K K n ,P n ,α n ) is a spanning subgraph of H(n; μ μ μ, K K K * n , P * n , α n ). This follows from the fact that under (C.5) the corresponding ER graphs satisfy G(n;α n ) ⊆ G(n; α * n ) meaning that for any monotone increasing graph property P (e.g., k-connectivity), the probability that G(n; α * n ) has P is larger than that of G(n;α n ); see [22, Sec. V.B] for details.
APPENDIX D PROOF OF LEMMA 12
The following result will be utilized in the proof of Lemma 12. where Z = (
. Taking the expectation over |ν m |, we get
by virtue of the fact that
is monotonically decreasing in m (see [22, Lemma 12] ). Next, we have
Also by recalling Fact 17, we get
Note that Now, consider a scaling such that 1 (n) = o(1). We have 1 (n) ≤ for all n sufficiently large. Given also that α n ≤ 1, we get
by virtue of (20) for all n sufficiently large. This completes the proof. Lemma 12 will be established by bounding each term in (57 where we set W = (
P−Kr
|| ) ( P ||
. We also have
using Fact 17 in the last step. We also know that 
B. Establishing (D.2)
Let Y Y Y be defined as follows Since K 1,n ≤ K r,n = o(P n ) in view of (8) APPENDIX E PROOF OF LEMMA 13 From (41) and the fact that β ,n = o(log n), we clearly have 1 2 log n n ≤ 1 (n) ≤ 2 log n n (E.1) for all n sufficiently large. We also have
Now, since p 1 j is monotone increasing in j = 1, . . . , r (see the proof of Proposition 14), we also see that
Thus, we obtain that
and the conclusion (61) immediately follows by virtue of (E.1) for all n sufficiently large. by virtue of the fact that p rr (n) ≤ 1.
